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ABSTRACT
Most economists and observers place the lack of fiscal discipline at the core of the recent Argentine
crisis. This begs the question of how countries like Belgium or Italy (pre-Maastricht) could run large
fiscal deficits and accumulate debts far beyond those of Argentina, without experiencing crises
nearly as dramatic as that of Argentina? Why is it that Argentina cannot act like Belgium or Italy
and pursue expansionary fiscal policy during downturns? We argue that advanced and emerging
economies differ in their financial depth, and show that lack of financial depth constrains fiscal
policy in a way that can overturn standard Keynesian fiscal policy prescriptions. We also provide
empirical support for this viewpoint. Crowding out is systematically larger in emerging markets than
in developed economies. More importantly, this difference is extreme during crises, when the
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Most economists and observers place the lack of ﬁscal discipline at the core of the recent Ar-
gentine crisis. This begs the question of how countries like Belgium or Italy (pre-Maastricht)
could run large ﬁscal deﬁcits and accumulate debts far beyond those of Argentina, with-
out experiencing crises nearly as dramatic as that of Argentina? Why is it that Argentina
cannot act like Belgium or Italy and pursue expansionary ﬁscal policy during downturns?
We provide an answer to these questions based on the observation that advanced and
emerging market economies diﬀer in their ﬁnancial depth. We show that lack of ﬁnancial
depth constrains ﬁscal policy in a way that can overturn standard Keynesian ﬁscal policy
prescriptions.
By ﬁnancial depth we mean the supply of funds available to the government and private
sector of an emerging market. Investing in an emerging market requires far more expertise
than investing in an advanced one. For example, it requires knowledge of political risk,
exchange rate risk, and the degree and form of corporate, judicial and government corrup-
tion. Segmentation is a prevalent feature of emerging markets. We refer to the small set of
investors who have the investment expertise on these markets as specialists. The ﬁnancial
depth of a country is limited by the liquidity controlled by these specialists.
As in our previous work (see Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004), we
model an external crisis as an event in which ﬁnancial depth is limited.1 In this context, the
country faces a quantity ﬁnancial-constraint on its borrowing. Any government expenditure
crowds out private investment; therefore loose ﬁscal policy may in fact be contractionary.
The crowding-out problem is ampliﬁed if expansionary ﬁscal policy worsens the quality
of the country’s assets. We illustrate two channels of ampliﬁcation. First, as the rising
share of public debt to private assets reduces the aggregate liquidity of the country’s assets,
specialists increase their required liquidity premium and this further reduces ﬁnancial depth.
Second, if the lack of ﬁscal discipline sparks investors’ fears regarding the ﬁscal responsibility
of the government, specialists endogenously lower their valuation of the country’s assets and
ﬁnancial depth also is reduced further.2
We provide empirical support for our crowding-out hypothesis by examining the diﬀer-
ential response of emerging and advanced economies to ﬁscal shocks. We ﬁrst extend the
1See Broner et al (2003) for extensive evidence of limited supply of funds during external crises.
2This second, signaling channel has a resemblance with some of the explanations in the literature on
“expansionary ﬁscal contractions” sparked by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), and discussed by Blanchard
(1990) and Drazen (1990). See also, e.g., Alesina and Perotti (1995), Giavazzi and Pagano (1996), and
Hemming et al (2002). More generally, the tight connection between ﬁscal policy and cost of credit in an
environment of tight capital ﬂo w si sc o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h ee v i d e n c ei nF a v e r oa n dG i a v a z z i( 2 0 0 3 )o nt h e
behavior of the Brazilean yield curve.
1results in (IADB 1997) and show that ﬁscal policy is indeed more pro-cyclical in emerging
economies than in advanced economies. We then turn to estimating the eﬀect of a ﬁscal
expansion on private investment. We show that this coeﬃcient is more negative in emerging
economies than in advanced economies. However, our main results are from a “diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerence” regression. We show that the diﬀerence between the response in crises and
in tranquil times is much bigger (more negative) in emerging economies than in advanced
ones.
In section 2 we make the basic connection between crowding out and ﬁnancial depth
during sudden stops of capital inﬂows. Sections 3 and 4 are the core of the paper and
present two models of extreme crowding out. In the ﬁrst one we we model the decline in the
liquidity of a country’s assets as the share of government debt in total assets rises, while in
the second one we highlight the negative signaling of a government that refuses to adjust
its ﬁscal accounts. The simple dynamic model of illiquidity in Section 3 is of independent
value. Section 5 present empirical evidence, and section 6 concludes.
2C r o w d i n g o u t
We consider a government that has a stock of debt, D, which it needs to reﬁnance. The
private sector has a total of I projects that it needs to fund. Each of these projects has a
marginal product of r. In sum, the ﬁnancing need of the government and the private sector
is I + D.
The international interest rate is r∗. During normal times, there are suﬃciently many
lenders (or collectively they have suﬃcient funds), so that all government debt and private
investment are ﬁnanced at the interest rate of r∗.
Our central assumption is that during an external crisis this supply of funds is con-
strained. At this point, the country has limited ﬁnancial depth. Formally, we assume that
there are many specialists, each with some limited funds to lend. The specialists are indexed
by q,w h e r eq is their eﬀective opportunity cost of lending (q ≥ r∗). In aggregate, the supply
schedule of funds is given as F(q), where F(·) is the mass of funds available for lending by
specialists whose opportunity cost is less than q.
Equating the demand for funds with the supply of funds yields,
I + D = F(q).
Since the private sector has marginal product of r, it is willing to pay up to r in order to
borrow funds. Thus in equilibrium,
I + D = F(r). (1)
2¿From this relation, we see an immediate constraint that the loss of ﬁnancial depth
during a crisis places on ﬁscal policy: If the government increases D, there is a one-for-one
crowding out of private investment. Figure 1 illustrates this scenario. On the vertical axis
we measure gross returns and on the horizontal the amount of external loans. During an
external crisis, the interest rate jumps to the maximum return the private sector can oﬀer,
which pins down the maximum (and actual) loans the country receives. Any new loan to





Figure 1: Crowding out
In the next sections we develop dynamic versions of this simple model and illustrate
potentially more drastic forms of crowding out.
3 Aggregate illiquidity and crowding out
In this section we show that if specialists have any liquidity preference, then as the share
of government debt in the economy increases, the liquidity of all of the country’s assets
falls. Specialists require a larger liquidity premium in response, and further reduce their
supply of funds. The reason behind this eﬀect is that the aggregate liquidity of a country
is ultimately linked to the productivity of its private assets. Government assets may be
backed by domestic transfers but they do not themselves generate aggregate returns. Thus,
as crowding out increases and returns from private assets decrease, the liquidity of the
country’s assets falls.
Our dynamic model is a fairly straightforward extension of the previous static model,
to which we add a government in order to derive the dynamics of government debt.
3Time is continuous. Our analysis starts with the onset of an exogenous crisis and ﬁnishes
with either the reversal of the crisis, or a ﬁnal attack which may precipitate a government
default. In any time interval dt, the reversal of the crisis occurs with exogenous probability
λdt. The attack event is endogenously determined by the behavior of specialists (see below).
For now, we denote the attack probability in the next dt as µtdt.
During the crisis period ﬁnancial depth is limited and the supply of funds to the country
is equal to F(q). We introduce some liquidity concerns among the specialists. We assume
that there are “long-term” and “short-term” specialists. The long-term specialists have
opportunity cost of funding of q<¯ q, with corresponding total mass of funds of ¯ F = F(¯ q).
Short-term specialists have cost of funding of q>¯ q. In addition to higher q’s, short-term
specialists also face the possibility of liquidity shocks. We model this by assuming that with
ﬂow probability of δdt a sunspot occurs in the next interval of time. If the sunspot occurs,
then the short-term specialists may exit the market for the next dt and cease lending.
Loans from specialists to both the government and private sector are assumed to be
short term (i.e. instantaneous). As before, since the marginal product of the private sector’s
projects is r, the interest rate on these loans is also r. If loans are repaid, they yield a ﬂow
excess return of (r − q)dt to an investor of type q. If there is default, the return is −1.3
The government values an expansionary ﬁscal policy, while it completely ignores the
eﬀect of its actions on private sector investment. We make this extreme assumption in
order to capture the short horizon of the type of governments that concern us here. The
ﬂow beneﬁti sgtdt. So, the government either continues an expansionary ﬁscal policy that
sets gt =¯ g>0, or balances the budget by setting gt = −rDt. The growth in public debt is
equal to,
˙ Dt = rDt + gt.
As mentioned, the crisis may end in a ﬁnal attack in which the government is unable to
roll over its debt, and has to reconcile its debt. We assume that the government cares about
the growth in the stock of debt because the cost of dealing with the attack is increasing in
Dt. But not all governments perceive the same cost. We assume that a government has a
type, θ, that parameterizes how concerned it is with the debt. In particular, a government
of type θ views the cost of debt as,
(1 − θ)C(D) C0 > 0,C 00 > 0.
3Note also that we have assumed full default, rather than partial default or restructuring. This is not
essential. What is important to our model is that there is a discrete expected loss when default takes place.
This holds as long as the degree of illiquidity after the run is substantial, which is the case in our model
except of a measure zero event (when the ﬁnal crisis takes place at the ﬁr s ti n s t a n ti nw h i c hi ti sf e a s i b l e ) .
See below.
4Our preferred interpretation of θ is that in the attack event, the government may react
as a “populist” and expropriate all ﬁnancial assets. We assume that a government of type
θ expropriates with probability 0 < θ < 1. In any interval of time dt, the probability of
expropriation is then µtθdt. Therefore, the supply of funds from specialists is F(r − µtθ),
so that the analogue of (1) is,
It + Dt = F(r − µtθt). (2)
The model has a sovereign principle built in, as default/expropriation occurs on all debts,
regardless of whether these were issued by the country’s private sector or the government.
Thus, foreign investors value corporate and government debt equally.
We next describe the liquidity concerns of specialists and link this to the attack proba-
bility µt. As noted earlier, a sunspot occurs in the next interval of time with ﬂow probability
of δdt. The sunspot may serve to coordinate an attack.
We assume that the sunspot is only observed by the short-term specialists. It is easy to
show that any short-term specialist that has seen a sunspot will withdraw from the country
for the next dt and not renew his ﬁnancing on any government or corporate loans. The
reason is that the beneﬁto fc o n t i n u i n gt oi n v e s ti nt h ec o u n t r yi s( r − q)dt,w h i c hi so f
order dt. On the other hand, if the attack occurs and the government defaults, the cost is
−1, which is an order of magnitude larger than the beneﬁt .T h u s ,a sl o n ga st h e r ei sa n y
chance of default, the optimal strategy for the short-term specialist is to withdraw.
The long-term specialists, on the other hand, continue lending regardless of events. We
assume that ¯ q>r− δθ. This ensures that they always earn a surplus on specialist lending
for all levels of Dt. Also, since they do not observe the sunspot of the short-term specialists,
the do not cease lending based on this sunspot.4
Then, in aggregate, if a sunspot occurs specialists will unwind a position of F − ¯ F assets.
There is no problem in unwinding the corporate position, since these are short-term loans
on completed projects. The problem may arise with the government loans. The government
will not repay these loans without ﬁrst securing ﬁnancing from other specialists. Thus the
question is whether the specialists that did not observe the liquidity shock have suﬃcient
resources to ﬁnance the government bonds of the exiting specialists. These resources will
be insuﬃcient if,
Dt > ¯ F, (3)
4There is still the possibility of a “run” equilibrium in which all of the long-term specialists do not renew
their ﬁnancing. We are implicitly ruling this out. One can imagine a sunspot also coordinating the short-
term specialists. In this case, we are analyzing a situation where the probability of this sunspot is very
small.
5in which case the government is not able to reﬁnance its debt and defaults with probability
θ.5
There are two cases to consider. For small levels of Dt < ¯ F, this inequality is not
satisﬁed, so that even if a sunspot occurs, there is suﬃcient liquidity to reﬁnance all of the
government’s debt. In this case, µt =0 .F o rl a r g el e v e l so fDt ≥ ¯ F, a sunspot always results
in distress and µt = δ.
¯ F is a maximum debt level a government can take on without risking a ﬁnal attack.
Thus, as Dt passes through this threshold the supply of funds from specialists falls from
F(r)t oF(r − δθ). In other words as the government crosses through the threshold, the
country’s assets become illiquid, and crowding out is more than one-for-one. More generally,
as long as government deﬁcits lower the liquidity of a country’s assets, crowding out will be
more severe.
Intuitively, when Dt is large, the marginal lender is a short-term specialist who is ﬁ-
nancing an implicitly long-term government liability. This is the source of the instability.
As in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), there is a “run” equilibrium, which we resolve with a
sunspot. Whenever the latter takes place, it precipitates an attack.
Note also that illiquidity has a more severe eﬀect on worse governments (i.e. higher θ’s).
That is, as government debt passes through the threshold, a worse government experiences
stronger crowding-out.
The model can be solved recursively because of the assumption that the government is
not concerned about private investment, and because the interest rate is constant during
the crisis. The government problem can be solved without regard for what investors think
of its actions, since the residual claimant of these actions is the domestic private sector.
The investor’s problem can be solved next, taking the actions of the government as given.
If the crisis ends before the attack occurs, the debt is repaid with taxes (which the
government does not internalize), and the government’s perception of the beneﬁts of a ﬁscal
expansion vanishes as well.6
5In a richer model, the government may be able to change the promised interest rate on its debt. Allowing
the government to increase the interest rate would smooth our results somewhat but it would not change
anything qualitatively. There would be a region of crisis and default, linked to the same considerations
discussed above. The main diﬀerence is that prior to the default event, the government would raise the
interest rate it pays on its bonds above r, thereby delaying the crisis. This would be realistic as highly
indebted governments (relative to the size of the specialists pool and private sector’s assets) would see more
frequent interest rate spikes. The point, however, is that there is still a Dt beyond which there is no interest
rise that can prevent the crisis from taking place.
6All that we require is that the government values g more during the crisis than during normal times.
6The government’s Bellman-Jacobi equation during the external crisis is:
0= m a x
gt∈{−rDt,¯ g}
©
V 0(Dt)(rDt + gt) − (λ + µ(Dt))V (Dt)+gt − µ(Dt)(1 − θ)C(Dt)
ª
. (4)






¯ g if Dt <D ∗(θ),
−rDt otherwise.
The government begins with debt D0. In order to keep the problem interesting, we
assume that D0 <D ∗(θ) ∀θ.7
Clearly no government will stop spending as long as Dt < ¯ F, which means that D∗(θ) ≥
¯ F.C o n s i d e r a θ such that D∗(θ) is strictly larger than ¯ F. In this case, substituting
gt = −rDt into equation (4) gives the boundary condition,




w h e r ew eh a v ea l s ou s e dt h ef a c tt h a tµ = δ.A tDt = D∗(θ) the government is indiﬀerent
between setting gt equal to ¯ g and setting it equal to −rDt. Manipulating this indiﬀerence
condition gives us the smooth pasting condition:
V 0(D∗(θ)) = −1. (6)
This gives us an equation that we can solve for D∗. T h es o l u t i o na p p l i e sa sl o n ga si ti s
greater than ¯ F.













The ﬁrst term in squared brackets is increasing in θ. A good type of government stops its
spending suﬃciently early that it never runs the risk of an attack, and crowding out is only
one-for-one. A worse type of government continues spending beyond ¯ F so that it creates
the more than one-for-one crowding out.
7We also assume that D
∗(θ) <F(r−δθ). That is no government ever fully crowds out the private sector.








<F(r − δ¯ θ). Without this assumption, the interest rate rises above r
when the private sector is fully crowded out, which unnecessarily complicates our analysis.
8It may be surprising that ¯ g does not appear in the above ﬁrst order condition, and hence in the expression
for D
∗. This is due to the linearity assumption in the objective function. The only role of ¯ g in our model
is to control the speed at which the government accumulates debt along the path. It does not aﬀect the
marginal ﬂow-utility of government expenditure.
74 Fiscal fears and crowding out
We now illustrate a second dynamic channel whereby crowding out is more than one-for-one.
Investors often worry that an emerging-market government may be ﬁscally irresponsible.
The government in charge may be too willing to run up expenditures, expecting not to be
around when the bills come due. Thus, another cost of ﬁscal expansions during a crisis is
that it may spark investor fear that the government is ﬁscally irresponsible. This further
reduces ﬁnancial depth as the number of specialists willing to lend to the country falls.
Although there are some interactions between the informational problem we highlight
here and the liquidity mechanism in the previous section, our point is best made by turning
oﬀ the liquidity mechanism. Thus, we make two modiﬁcations of our previous model. First,
we simplify the liquidity story and assume that the attack parameter, µ, is exogenous and
constant (alternatively, we are looking only in the region where D> ¯ D). We assume that all
of the specialists are of the same type, indexed by q, as in Section 2. Second, we assume that
the type θ is not publicly known. The unconditional distribution of the latter is θ ∼ U[0, ¯ θ].
Investors infer the type of the government from the history of government actions since
the beginning of the crisis and its initial level of debt,
b θt ≡ E[θ|{gs}s=0...t,D 0].
The expected return on lending in an interval dt is,
(r − µb θt)dt,
and the corresponding supply of funds faced by the country is:
F(r − µb θt). (8)
Our analysis is conducted in the region where r − µb θt >r ∗.
The analysis of the problem is very similar to the previous case. In particular, since
the government is not concerned with private investment, it does not try to signal its type
through its actions. Thus the government problem is identical to that of the previous





¯ g if Dt <D ∗(θ),
−rDt otherwise,










8Since D∗0(θ) > 0, the more populist a government is, the slower its ﬁscal tightening.
Investors understand this and update their priors with respect to the government’s type
based on the path of government’s expenditures. If gt =¯ g, investors know that the type of









Conversely, if the ﬁscal deﬁcit is eliminated, investors learn that the value of θ is the best
of all those that were possible before adjustment took place.
The solid line in Figure 2 illustrates the path of expected default, µb θ,a st h ee x t e r n a l
crisis goes on and the government does not adjust its ﬁscal deﬁcit. The dashed line, on the
other hand, shows the path of expected default for the best θ possible, given the level of
Dt. When a government adjusts, it shifts the market perception from a point on the solid
line to the corresponding point on the dashed line. At this time there is full revelation and
updating stops, b θt0 = θ ∀t0 ≥ t.
mq
t
Figure 2: Expected Default
mqt
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Again, this environment exhibits a more extreme form of crowding out than that in
the static model of Section 2. During the external crisis, the country faces an aggregate
ﬁnancial constraint:
It + Dt = F(r − µb θt). (10)
Taking beliefs about the type of government as given, ﬁscal expenditure crowds out private
investment one-for-one (as in Section 2). But an expansionary ﬁscal policy during the crisis
does not leave beliefs unchanged. This negative updating further reduces the supply of
9funds to the country, and private investment falls more than one-for-one with the rise in
ﬁscal expenditure.
The other face of this perverse relation between ﬁscal policy and the availability of
ﬁnancial resources is the great beneﬁt of adjustment. Adjustment leads b θ to fall sharply
and there is a jump in the resources made available by specialists.9 Note, however, that
cutting the deﬁcit late does not take the economy to the same point as would cutting the
deﬁcit early. The reason is that along the path, investors have learned that the government
is more populist than a government that reacts early. That is, the country’s “fundamentals,”
which include the perceived quality of its government, are no longer the same.10
5 Empirical Evidence
This section begins with some facts on the cyclical behavior of public deﬁcits in countries
with and without ﬁnancial depth. It concludes with tests supporting the hypotheses that
crowding-out is larger in emerging economies than in advanced ones and, most importantly,
that this diﬀerence rises signiﬁcantly during crises.
5.1 Cyclicality of Deﬁcits
Let us contrast the behavior of ﬁscal variables in advanced economies vis a vis emerging
economies. Beginning with an example, we contrast the experience of Italy during the
1980s with that of Argentina and Brazil in the late 1990s. Each of these country-episodes is
known for a high ﬁscal deﬁcit within its respective comparison group and the centrality of
the deﬁcit in public debate about macroeconomic outcomes. Panel (a) in Figure 3 presents
the evolution of public debt and overall ﬁscal deﬁcit as a percentage of GDP for Italy during
the 1980s. Debt is reported on the left axis while the deﬁcit is measured on the right axis.
P a n e l s( b )a n d( c )r e p e a tt h i sﬁgure for Argentina and Brazil, respectively, during the late
1990s. It is apparent from this ﬁgure that both the level and change of public debt (i.e.
roughly public deﬁcits) are signiﬁcantly larger for Italy than for Argentina and Brazil in
the relevant periods. While the maximum deﬁcit in Italy was above 15%, it was below 4%
in Argentina. Public debt in Italy was more than twice as large as in Argentina and Brazil.
9A recent example of this scenario is the sharp fall in Brazil’s sovereign spreads when investors, after
seeing Lula’s ﬁscal austerity plan, realized that he was less populist than feared.
10We have made extreme assumptions to isolate our main points. One of these assumptions is that the
government is not concerned about signaling since the cost of a bad signal is paid in full by the private
sector, which does not concern the government during the crisis. If we reintroduce some concern by the
government, then one may ﬁnd that a government is willing to stop spending early when the signaling gain
is large, but not late when the bad reputation is already too hard to undo. See Angeletos et al (2003) for
recent developments on policy signaling models.
10It is also interesting to point out, although this is not the main point that concerns us in
this section, that Brazil made a signiﬁcant eﬀort to reduce its deﬁcits while Argentina did
not.
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The cyclical behavior of these deﬁcits is also very diﬀerent across these economies. In
Italy the deﬁcit is countercyclical, while it is not in Argentina and Brazil. The correlation
between the cyclical component of the public deﬁcit and the cyclical component of GDP is
-0.53 for Italy, and 0.02 and 0.28 for Argentina and Brazil, respectively.11 This diﬀerence
is also apparent when looking only at the expenditure side. The correlation between the
cyclical component of government expenditures and GDP is -0.38 for Italy, and 0.83 and
11The cyclical components are computed using the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter. For these introductory numbers
we use data beginning in the 1960s, when available. Later on in our regressions we use data for the 1980s
and 1990s for developed economies and for the 1990s for emerging markets. These shorter samples yield
similar conclusions.
110.51, for Argentina, and Brazil, respectively.
These patterns extend beyond these few economies. They can be generalized to dif-
ferences between emerging and advanced economies. The top of Table 1 reproduces the
above evidence while the bottom report the medians of similar statistics for emerging and
advanced economies.12 While the diﬀerences are not as dramatic as for the extreme coun-
try/episodes in our example, it is still apparent that the use of countercyclical ﬁscal policy
is a reality for advanced economies but not for most emerging market economies.13




Emerging (median) -4.41% 45.60%
Advanced (median) -47.09% 9.08%
Table 1: Procyclicality of Fiscal Policy
We argued with our models that an important candidate for explaining the diﬀerences
between both groups of countries is ﬁnancial depth. In emerging markets, limited funding
constrains the use of ﬁscal policy during crises.
Measuring ﬁnancial depth as the ratio of credit to the private sector over GDP, Argentina
and Brazil have ratios of 25% and 30% in the late 1990s, while in Italy the ratio exceeds
70% during the 1980s (i.e. the period of large public deﬁcits).
More generally, Table 2 presents cross-country regressions of two measures of ﬁscal pro-
cyclicality on indices of ﬁnancial development (private credit over GDP and liquid liabilities
over GDP).14 We report OLS and IV (using legal origins as instruments, along the lines of
LaPorta, et al., 1998) results. Virtually all combinations tell the same story: there is a sig-
niﬁcant and negative eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on the degree of procyclicality of ﬁscal
variables. That is, more ﬁnancially developed economies experience more countercyclical
ﬁscal policy.
These results are economically signiﬁcant. For instance, a representative country in
the top quartile of the distribution of private credit has a correlation between the cyclical
12The sample in this exercise corresponds to 88 emerging and 22 advanced economies with information in
the 1960-2002 period. The classiﬁcation of emerging and advanced economies follows that of the IMF.
13This was one of the central messages in IADB (1997).
14T h es o u r c eo fo u rm e a s u r e so fﬁnancial development is the Financial Structure Database of the World
Bank. Private credit includes credit by commercial banks and other ﬁnancial institutions. Liquid liabilities
include currency and deposits (time and interest-bearing) in banks and other ﬁnancial intermediaries. (See
Beck at al. (1999) for a detailed description of the original sources.)
12components of GDP and deﬁcit of -0.39; while that of a country located in the bottom
quartile of the distribution is -0.04.15












Number of countries 85 85
Table 2: Procyclicality of Fiscal Variables and Financial Development. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses.
5.2 Evidence of State Dependent Crowding-Out
We now turn to assessing how crowding-out of private investment varies across advanced
and emerging market economies, especially during severe contractions and crises. For this,
we estimate:
Iit = λIit−1 + αDit + βDitCit + γXit + θXitCit. (11)
I, D and C, respectively, are (private or total) investment over GDP, public deﬁcit over
GDP, and an indicator function that takes a value of one if there is a “crisis” and zero oth-
erwise. X is a group of controls, including a constant, and the relative price of capital.16,17
15The median country in the top quartile is South Africa with a ratio of private credit to GDP of 50%,
while the median country in the bottom quartile is Nepal where private credit to GDP is only about 10%.
16We also have conducted robustness checks including the domestic real interest rate and domestic private
credit growth as well as interactions of these variables with the crisis indicator. The results are unaﬀected
by these additions. Probably, this is partly due to standard problems for interest rates to appear signiﬁcant
in investment equations. As well as due to the fact that in practice crowding out takes place through many
channels which are only partially captured by domestic interest rates and bank loans.
17Aside from our speciﬁct e s t s ,t h i ss p e c i ﬁcation is justiﬁed in more detail by Serven (2003).
13All speciﬁcations include ﬁxed eﬀects and the lagged dependent variable on the right
hand side is instrumented using the second lag of the dependent variable.
5.2.1 Data and samples
We obtain the data from multiple sources. Total investment and the relative price of capital
are from Heston et al. (2002). We construct private investment by removing government
investment from total investment. We obtain the former from the Government Finance
Statistics of the IMF (GFS). The latter is also the source for the public deﬁcit information.
Growth of private credit and real interest rates were obtained from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators.
Our panels are unbalanced, with the sample restricted to countries that have a minimum
of ﬁve observations. We split the sample into two groups: one including 18 advanced
economies and another including 13 emerging economies. We use the IMF’s classiﬁcation
system to allocate countries to each of these groups. We include all the advanced economies
in that classiﬁcation: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
UK, and USA. For less developed economies we restrict the sample to those countries that
are suﬃciently developed so as to have access to capital ﬂows. Moreover, we exclude the
transition economies because they experienced shocks and reforms of a very diﬀerent nature
during the 1990s. These two criteria plus the minimum of ﬁve observations for each variable
reduce that sample of emerging markets to: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia,
India, Mexico, Malaysia, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Venezuela. We
study periods when international capital ﬂows are relevant for each of the groups: the 1980s
and 1990s for the advanced economies, and the 1990s for the emerging market economies.
A key variable for us is the indicator of crisis. For this, we use three indicators built from
the current account to GDP ratio, GDP growth, and country risk. The latter is measured
as 100 minus the Euromoney country risk rating, which is available for the 1980s and 1990s
for advanced economies and for the 1990s for emerging economies.18 Our crises indicators
take ﬁrst diﬀerences of each of these variables. Crises are periods when these are located in
the highest (lowest) quartile of the distribution of changes, across all countries, of current
18Note that the popular EMBI/EMBI+ constructed by JPMorgan is only available for a subsample of
emerging economies and at most from 1994. The Euromoney country risk rating has been used in other
papers, for instance Haque, et al., (1996) use this indicator to study determinants of country risk. The
Euromoney index is built using polls of economists and political analysts. The index goes from 0 to 100,
with an increase meaning a rise in creditworthiness and is a weighted average of analytical indicators (weight
of 40%, including political risk, economic risk, and economic performance), credit indicators (weight of 20%,
payment record and rescheduling), and market indicators (weight of 40%, access to bond markets, selldown
on short-term paper, and access to discount available for forfeiting).
14account and country risk (GDP growth). Table 3 summarizes the fraction of observations
identiﬁed as crises for each set of countries.
Deﬁnition of Crises
Period Growth CA Country Risk
Emerging economies 1990s 7.3 7.3 9.3
Advanced economies 1980s 5.1 7.0 8.8
Advanced economies 1990s 2.9 2.1 2.0
Table 3: Fraction of crises-observations, by countries and periods
5.2.2 Main results
Tables 4 and 5 presents our main results from estimating equation (11). The former table
reports results for private investment while the latter does it for total investment. The top
half of each table contains the results for emerging market economies, while the bottom half
reports the results for the advanced economies. The conclusions are quite clear and robust
across most of the speciﬁcations:
• Crowding out is present in advanced and emerging economies but is much larger in
the latter group (coeﬃcient in the Dit rows).
• Most importantly for our hypothesis, while in advanced economies the extent of crowd-
ing out is similar across tranquil and crises times, in emerging markets crowding out
rises signiﬁcantly during crises (sum of coeﬃcient in Dit and DitCit).
• In fact, in most cases crowding out during crises exceeds one even in the short run.
The long run estimates, which simply divide the short run results by one minus the
coeﬃcient on Iit−1, typically exceed two — a very extreme form of crowding out.
6 Conclusion
We have shown how limited ﬁnancial depth during crises constrains ﬁscal policy and limits
its use as a countercylical policy instrument. In fact, using it in this fashion may backﬁre.
Emerging markets crises invariably stem from a combination of bad luck and ﬁnancial
factors. Argentina was no exception to these factors. However, one of the factors that
set the Argentine experience apart was the poor response of the authorities to the initial
phases of the crisis. Argentina was too late in adjusting its ﬁscal accounts. Along with
15Emerging Countries
Iit−1 0.475 0.535 0.439
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dit -0.739 -0.662 -0.793
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DitCit -0.664 -0.159 -0.681
(0.043) (0.502) (0.023)
Cit -2.009 -3.403 -0.291
(0.043) (0.000) (0.780)
Obs./Countries 106/13 106/13 106/13
Time Period 1990s 1990s 1990s
Crisis indicator Growth CA Country Risk
Long-Run Crowding-Out
Tranquil -1.408 -1.424 -1.414
Crisis -2.672 -1.766 -2.627
Advanced Countries
Iit−1 0.482 0.488 0.472
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dit -0.178 -0.170 -0.229
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DitCit 0.101 0.177 0.057
(0.346) (0.029) (0.223)
Cit -1.357 -2.155 -0.332
(0.064) (0.001) (0.373)
Obs./Countries 297/18 297/18 297/18
Time Period 1980-1990s 1980-1990s 1980-1990s
Crisis indicator Growth CA Country Risk
Long-Run Crowding-Out
Tranquil -0.344 -0.332 -0.434
Crisis -0.149 0.014 -0.326
Table 4: Private Investment. P-values are presented in parentheses. Covariates include the
(log of)relative price of capital and interactions of this variable with the crisis indicator.
16Emerging Countries
Iit−1 0.504 0.537 0.455
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dit -0.746 -0.728 -0.800
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DitCit -0.482 -0.066 -0.624
(0.099) (0.779) (0.019)
Cit -2.384 -2.583 -0.444
(0.013) (0.006) (0.660)
Obs./Countries 112/13 112/13 112/13
Time Period 1990s 1990s 1990s
Crisis indicator Growth CA Country Risk
Long-Run Crowding-Out
Tranquil -1.504 -1.572 -1.468
Crisis -2.476 -1.715 -2.613
Advanced Countries
Iit−1 0.436 0.448 0.450
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dit -0.215 -0.211 -0.255
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DitCit 0.083 0.164 0.063
(0.405) (0.019) (0.127)
Cit -1.105 -2.094 -0.437
(0.106) (0.000) (0.178)
Obs./Countries 309/18 309/18 309/18
Time Period 1980-1990s 1980-1990s 1980-1990s
Crisis indicator Growth CA Country Risk
Long-Run Crowding-Out
Tranquil -0.381 -0.382 -0.464
Crisis -0.234 -0.085 -0.349
Table 5: Total Investment. P-values are presented in parentheses. Covariates include the
(log of)relative price of capital and interactions of this variable with the crisis indicator.
17the political environment, this poor response worsened the quality of Argentina’s assets by
reducing aggregate liquidity and reigniting fears of populism.
The recent experience of Brazil under President Lula reﬂects the other side of the coin.
Faced with deteriorating external ﬁnancial conditions, and contrary to expectations, Brazil’s
government endorsed tight ﬁscal discipline. Markets were positively surprised that the
government was not as populist as many feared. The reaction was a sharp reversal of
capital outﬂows.
Our model captures these events. Slow ﬁscal adjustment weakens investors’ perception
of the country’s assets through two channels: it lowers the perceived quality of the gov-
ernment; and it reduces the liquidity of the country’s assets by crowding out productive
investments. Conversely, early adjustment can result in a dramatic improvement in the
country’s performance.
Our evidence points clearly in the direction of a crowding-out mechanism that is more
severe in emerging market economies than in advanced ones. More importantly, this dif-
ference rises during periods of crises. In emerging markets, crowding-out is more than
one-for-one during crises, suggesting that ﬁscal expansions at those times are in fact very
contractionary. This, together with the direct impact of capital ﬂow reversals, may ex-
plain why ﬁscal policy is much less countercyclical in emerging market economies than in
advanced ones.
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